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Guerrilla warfare is an ancient style of armed conflict that continues to be practiced 
throughout the world to the present day (Guevara, "A Method" 266, Tzu 168, Taber 149-150), 
and many countries and peoples have either taken part in guerrilla warfare or have sought to 
counteract irregular war with counterinsurgency methods, for example the United States 
(Anderson, Guerrillas xi ; West xiii; Guevara, G. Warfare 18; O'Neill vii-xi). 1 Guerrilla warfare 
heavily impacts every aspect of society , ranging from the family unit to foreign policy decision-
making. Only through properly understanding the motivations , strategies and nature of guerrilla 
warfare will we be equipped to progress in terms of the social , political and economic aspects of 
society that guerrilla warfare activities influence (Taber 16). 
This study consists of an analysis of the guerrilla warfare theories and battlefield 
strategies utilized by Ernesto 'Che' Guevara, the Argentine-born Cuban revolutionary considered 
by most people as the premier thinker on the nature of guerrilla warfare (Anderson , Che xiii). 
Guevara developed his Jaco theory of guerrilla warfare based on the mode of warfare used 
successfully during the Cuban Revolutionary War, and then sought to replicate this achievement 
in the The Congo and Bolivia (Guevara, G. Warfare vii; Guevara, "To Fidel" 375; Villegas 1).2 
After a brief introduction on the nature of guerrilla warfare in general, this thesis proceeds to 
analyze the theoretical writings on guerrilla warfare by Guevara , as seen in his seminal treatise 
Guerrilla Warfare: A Method (1963). We then proceed to analyze his application of Jaco theory 
1 
Guerrilla Warfare continues in myriad locales around the globe (e .g. Mexico's group , the Ejercito Zapatista de 
Liberaci6n Nacional, as well as other manifestations of this form of warfare) (MacIntyre 1-88; O'Neill vii-xi). The 
Village, a product of the Vietnam War , portrays the realities of war and the tactics of differing armed conflict styles 
- in this case, it depicts Vietnamese guerrilla warfare strategies and U.S. counterinsurgency methods. 
2 
Guerrilla Warfare, a manual written by Ernesto 'Che' Guevara provides a theoretical-practical perspective of 
guerrilla warfare based on the experiences of the revolutionary war in Cuba . Reminisc ences of the Cuban 
Revolutionary War walks the reader through Guevara ' s personal experiences and battlefield notes during the war 
providing an in-depth understanding to Guevara ' s guerrilla warfare theories and ideology , based on the Cuban 
Revolutionary experience (Moreno 120). 
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as an on-the-ground guerrilla leader to evaluate the praxis of said theory during his guerrilla 
campaigns in Cuba, and later on in The Congo. In our evaluation of Guevara's understanding of 
guerrilla warfare and its application in situ in The Congo, this study seeks to determine where 
battlefield applications of said theory were successful or not, according to the author himself, and 
why he perceived them in that manner. We also hope to uncover what lessons may be gleaned 
from both his guerrilla warfare theory and its praxis to provide an analytical lens through which 
we may better understand today's insurgent /guerrilla methods. A proper analysis of the 
principles and practices of guerrilla warfare is imperative to understanding the dynamics of 
guerrilla ideology, as well as the resolution of the underlying conflicts at hand that lead to 
guerrilla conflicts, in general. 
2. Understanding Guevara's Foco Theory 
Ernesto 'Che ' Guevara 's Guerrilla Wa,far e sought to develop armed conflict theory 
rooted in the objective and subjective realities of the Cuban Revolutionary War for application in 
terms of future battlefield situations (Guevara , "A Method" 268-269; Guevara, G. Warfare vii ; 
Villegas I; G. March 3). Written in 1963, this manual provides a theoretical outline of the 
essence of guerrilla warfare by addressing its fundamental purpose, principles, and the nature of 
its combatants (Guevara, G. Warfare vii, 13-45, 49-91; Villegas 1). Its purpose is also to inform 
and inspire others to rise up against their exploiters through revolutionary struggle (Guevara , G. 
Warfare 13; G. March 3; Guevara, "Socialism" 250-252). 
2.1 Guerrilla Warfare's Purpose 
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Ernesto Guevara defines guerrilla warfare as "the basis of the struggle of a people to 
redeem themselves " (G. Wa,fare 15). That is, Guevara perceived the guerrilla army as a 
defensive movement rooted within the fighting masses with the purpose of interpreting and 
fulfilling the people 's aspirations, with the guerrilla fighter as the vanguard of the people ("A 
Method" 272; G. Warfare 16; "Socia lism" 247). The struggle is "a war of the people," where the 
people fight for their freedom to liberate themselves when oppressive authorities have 
maintained power against established law and have exhausted efforts for peace-making 
(Guevara, G. Warfare 13-14, 16). The name the rebel leader uses in his manual adequately 
depicts this definition of guerri lla warfare , which he referred to as the form of warfare utilized in 
the "Cu ban war of liberatio n" (Guevara, G. Warfare 41 ; Guevara, "A Method " 278) . 
Guevara did not believe a simple impulse was enough for a revolution , but rather that a 
purpose /reason rooted in concrete social goals must be embedded within every guerri llero/a 
(guerrilla combatant /fighter) in order to withstand the grueling nature of guerrilla combat and to 
sustain the ongoing revolution (G. Warfare 14; 53-54 ; "A Method" 268, 273; "Soc ialism" 260). 
An examp le of a primary social goal of the Cuban Revolutionary War was that of "agrar ian 
reform" in which peasants joined the guerrillas to seek changes in ownership of cultivable land 
and changes in social treatment leading to greater socia l justice (Guevara, G. Warfare 17; 
Guevara, Reminisc ences 30, 159; Taber 32). Social goals function as a catalyst for a dedication 
to the cause during and beyond moments of actual combat because they stem from the peoples' 
aspirations and desires. 3 In other words , they are social goals for and of the people (Guevara, 
"Socialism" 247,258; Guevara , Reminiscences 30). 
3 
Voluntary work is something Gueva ra gave strong dedica tion to bec ause he saw it as a stepping- stone toward s 
building Cub a's new society ("Voluntary " 238). 
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2.2 Principles, Strategies , and Tactics of Guerrilla Warfare 
Guevara's writings repeatedly emphasize a primary component of guerrilla warfare: the 
people (G. Warfare 13-21; "A Method" 267; "Socialism" 252-253; Reminiscences 83).4 In 
"Guerrilla Warfare : A Method," he expresses that a "guerrilla war is a people's war, and it is a 
mass struggle. To attempt to conduct this type of war without the support of the populace is a 
prelude to inevitable disaster" (Guevara, "A Method" 267). Why would Guevara consider 
guerrilla warfare a war by and of the people? In this text, the rebel strategist quotes The Second 
Declaration of Havana , which states that the masses /rural populations in Latin America 
constitute the majority of Latin American populations, exceeding 70 percent of a country's 
population (Guevara, "A Method" 267). The Declaration also states that the masses earn their 
"living as farm laborers for wretched wages , or they till the soil under conditions of exploitation 
not exceeded by the Middle Ages" (Guevara , "A Method" 267) . Guevara considers guerrilla 
warfare a people's war because the masses are the exploited peasants who when unified, make 
up the bulk of the fighting force , and will fight for the justice they have always been neglected. 
This was the case in the Cuban Revolutionary War, a successful revolution supported by its 
masses (Guevara, "A Method" 267; Anderson, Guerrillas xi; Guevara, Reminiscences 257-272). 
The Cuban experience not only provided Guevara with ideological principles on how to 
conduct guerrilla warfare, but also a wide range of on-the-ground strategies and tactics for the 
analysis, and the incorporation of said analysis, into his theory of guerri lla warfare. Throughout 
Guerrilla Warfare and his Cuban campaign diary Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolutionary 
4 
Citations included are from the many written statements where Guevara emphasizes the people being central to 
guerrilla warfare. 
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War, the following four strategies /tactics appear constantly, and are emphasized throughout 
Guevara's writings: 1.) Organization and discipline; 2.) Knowledge of the terrain; 3.) Support of 
the people; and 4 .) Mobility . Therefore , a brief overview of the importance of these 
strategies /tactics to the success of the revolution is necessary. 
Guevara identifies that, in order for the guerrilla band to ensure its survival and ultimate 
goal of conquest of political power, the guerrilla must have organization and discipline ("A 
Method" 272; Moreno 121). Guerrilla fighters must be strategically organized in all movements 
to produce continuous blows, wear down the enemy while appearing to be everywhere at all 
times (Guevara, G. Warfare 20, 22-23; Taber 3 I). Otherwise, unnecessary occurrences can take 
place , such as what occurred in the Battle of Pino de! Agua of 1957 during the Cuban 
Revolutionary War. Guevara writes that, "although it was a political and military victory, our 
shortcomings were enormous. The surprise factor should have been fully exploited . .. a false 
order to retreat had been circulated . . . a lack of decisiveness was evident in seizing the vehicles" 
(Reminiscences 152). Among other mishaps , low discipline and organization within the guerrilla 
forces can lead to mutinies among its troops . This was almost the case some time after 
September 1957 during the Cuban Revolutionary War when a combatant in Guevara's guerrilla 
band pointed his gun at another guerrilla combatant's head as if he intended to shoot; the gun 
unintentionally went off killing the guerrillero (Reminiscences 156-157). 
Along with organization and discipline , knowledge of the terrain also ensures the security 
and continuity of the guerrilla fighters. To know the lay of the land gives the guerrilla the 
advantage, ranging from attacking from zones difficult to reach to being able to move through 
the terrain more efficiently and effectively than the enemy (Guevara, G. Warfare 32-33; Moreno 
117; Taber 155) . Guerrilla combatants must have perfect knowledge of the topography because 
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they will be outnumbered and will need to use the ground to their advantage (Taber I 55). 
Guevara's written accounts of the Cuban Revolutionary War describe a situation in the Battle of 
El Hombrito where the guerrilla troops were up against at least 140 regular army soldiers , well 
armed for modern warfare (Reminiscences 139). The guerrillas not only had far less numbers but 
also only a "handful of weapons" to fight with (Guevara , Reminiscences 139). In the Battle of 
Santa Clara, the odds for the guerrilla troops were more disadvantageous: the ratio was one 
guerrilla combatant against 10-15 Batista army soldiers (Guevara, Reminiscences 257). By 
knowing the lay of the land, the guerrilla band can better and more efficiently determine when to 
attack , where to hide , and how to use its resources (e.g. ammunition) to have the upper hand in 
such scenarios (Guevara , G. Warfare 32-36 ; Moreno 117). 
Given that guerrilla warfare is a people's war , the support of the people is vital to the 
survival of the guerrilla movement: the masses facilitate transport , communication , supplies and 
much more (Guevara , G. Warfare 17, 31-37 ; Moreno 118, 122; Taber 27). An inhabitant of the 
region , a peasant , also has better knowledge of the terrain and can prove to be an exceptional 
guide (Moreno I 17-118 , 122). Experiences from the Cuban Revolutionary War show the 
effectiveness of this strategy: "a peasant informed us that a large troop was preparing to ascend 
the Sierra Maestra along the road to El Hombrito" (Guevara , Reminisc ences 135). Because of the 
support of the people , the guerrilla movement was provided with valuable intelligence allowing 
the guerrillas to get in position to attack rather than be attacked. In "Guerrilla Warfare: A 
Method, " Guevara reminds us once again that "revolutionary power" is based on the support of 
the people and therefore the needs and wants of the peasants must be attended to at all possible 
levels (277). 
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Lastly, a guerrilla band may develop different stages throughout its protracted war but in 
nearly all of the stages, the mobility of the armed group remains a vital factor for its security and 
survival (Guevara , "A Method" 276; Moreno 117; Taber 161). Based on the Cuban 
Revolutionary War experience, the guerrillas start out as a small group that devotes itself almost 
entirely to hiding and moving nomadically between the wildest and most inaccessible places 
(Guevara, G. Warfare 88). As the guerrilla force grows in number, it then begins to camp out for 
several days at a time , rapidly moving to another location when the enemy is near. Even when 
the guerrilla band has reached a stationary state where its numbers are larger than ever before, it 
maintains small groups that it can dispatch to other places of combat; that is, the guerrilla army is 
constantly moving (Guevara , G. Warfare 88-89) . 
2.3 Nature of the Guerrilla Combatant 
ln his manual , Guevara expresses that the guerrilla fighter fights , "to change a social 
regime that affects one ' s own world"-meaning they fight against oppression and for social 
justice ( G. Warfare 17, 52; Moreno 116; Taber 3 ). The guerrilla combatant is embodied as a 
"social reformer" who is the bearer of the people's cause (Guevara , G. Wa,fare 17, 49-50) . The 
guerrill ero/a is a protector who exemplifies the significance of the revolution in all s/he does, 
always having rigid self-control, employing high moral conduct and discipline both within and 
outside of the guerrilla movement (Guevara , G. Warfare 49-51, 52-65; Moreno 116).5 The best 
5 Among many other traits vital to a guerrilla fighter are benevolence and respect (Guevara , G. Warfare 52-53) . 
They must be benevolent to defenseless prisoners and provide medical assistance to the captured wounded enemy 
(Guevara , G. Warfare 53; Guevara, Reminisc ences 148-150). Guevara exemplifies these characteristics well in the 
battle of Pino de! Agua during the Cuban Revolutionary War. When a guerrilla combatant kills a wounded solider 
from Cuban Dictator Batista ' s army rather than providing medical assistance , Guevara reprimands the combatant 
fiercely for "this mindless act of violence" who had seen his family killed by Dictator Batista's army (Reminis cences 
148-149). Another captured wounded Batista soldier overheard Guevara's words and whenever a guerrillola wo uld 
pass near him he would yell, "Don ' t kill me' "Don ' t kill me! Che says not to kill prisoners!" (Guevara , 
Reminiscences 149-150). 
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guerrilla soldier is considered to be a peasant, for it is s/he who lives the daily burdens of an 
unjust reality (Guevara, G. Wmfare 52) . 
A guerrilla combatant serves as a "guardian angel" of the masses , leading them towards 
"profound , essential changes in the social structure," and bringing about a new society through 
revolutionary awareness (Guevara, G. Warfare 50-51; Guevara, Reminiscences 159; Guevara , 
"Socialism" 249-250, 252) . Guevara calls this process , concientizaci6n , an awakening of a social 
consciousness among the people that, in the development of a post-capitalistic society, leads to 
the creation of a "New Man" (i.e. new person/self with a new mindset , beliefs , and values) 
("Socialism" 247,252 ; Spicer-Escalante 398). 6 As Michael Lowy states, 
The dream of all great revolutionaries . . .. has been to change not merely 'the 
world' but also 'man': the revolution, for them , is not only a transformation of 
social structures , institutions , and regimes , but also a profound , radical, and 
'overturning ' (umwiilzende) transformation of men, of their consciousness , ways, 
values , and habits, of their social relations . ( 17) 
It is the duty of the guerrilla combatant to instill the significance of the revolution within the 
masses through concientizaci6n (Guevara , G. Warfare 51; Spicer-Escalante 398)7. S/he must also 
6 
In Guevara's original Spanish text of "Socialism and Man in Cuba ," he does use a male gendered form of the 
"New Man." Given that Spanish is a very gendered language, this factor must be considered in the analysis of 
Guevara ' s construct of the "New Man" as a gender-neutral or gender-specific concept (Guevara , "Socialism" 
(1965); Spicer-Escalante 399, 405). 
7 Depending on the circumstances , the guerrilla fighter's role may seem as a contradiction in Guevara's guerrilla 
warfare ideology . His theory states that the revolutionary struggle is a people ' s war that of which thefoco (group of 
conscious rebels) is the peoples' leader. The contradiction appears because the struggle is said to be of the people, 
when it is led by a foco of conscious rebels who may not have emerged from the masses , such as Guevara himself 
who was from an aristocratic Argentine family (Guevara , "A Method" 267 ; Moreno 118, 119, 130; Anderson , Che 
xiv ; Taber 24) . In the case of Camilo Cienfuego s, a peasant who later became third in command of the Cuban 
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provide a "revolutionary indoctrination," infom1ing "the soldiers, peasants, and workers, who 
have all come from the people , the justice and the truth of each revolutionary act , the goals of the 
revolution , why there is a struggle" (Guevara , G. Warfare 139-140) . The guerrilla fighter is part 
of a vanguard that awakens the masses' awareness of the necessity of their incorporation into 
society, and their importance as the "motor of that society" (Guevara, "Socialism" 247, 252). 
These revolutionary ideas, gleaned from Guevara's experience in the Cuban Revolutionary War, 
are directly related to his later involvement in the revolutionary movement in the post-colonial 
Congo. 
Guevara's Jaco theory of guerrilla warfare , primarily based on the expenences of the 
successful Cuban Revolutionary War as noted above , outlines in essence that the conditions 
necessary for a revolution can be created (Moreno 1 15). The use of a "highly cohesive group" of 
organized guerrilla fighters , called a Jaco, emerge from rural areas and act as the catalyst for a 
revolutionary situation (Moreno 115). The Jaco instills revolutionary consciousness 8 within the 
masses , mobilizes the people and as the vanguard leads them into revolutionary action with the 
ultimate goal of conquering political power (Moreno I 18-119, 129, Guevara , "A Method " 268, 
272 ; Taber 43). 
3. Guerrilla Warfare Praxis: The Congo 
Having established the basis for Guevara's Jaco theo1y, we now proceed to apply his 
ideas to his experience in The Congo. From the beginning of his writings on his experience in 
The Congo, the rebel strategist describes his involvement within the Congolese guerrilla force as 
Revolutionary War , the contradiction of the guerrilla combatant ' s role is not present because he rose from within the 
mas ses and became one of his people ' s trusted leaders (Guevara , C. Wa,far e 7-9). 
8 
The fo co instills revolutionary consciousness through social class awareness and understanding, while providing 
ju stice and protection for the masses when the repressive government does not (Guevara , "A Method" 268 ; Guevara , 
" Soci alism " 252 ; Moreno 118; Dodd " Focoism "). 
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"a failure" (Guevara , Congo 15). Our task is to determine why, according to Guevara, the 
application of Jaco theory was unsuccessful in that country. In order to do so, we hope to 
establish what objective and subjective conditions were present which led to Guevara's 
assessment of the guerrilla campaign as a failure. Obviously, there are many conditions that may 
have contributed to Guevara's evaluation of the unsuccessful on-the-ground practice of foco 
theory in The Congo. For the purpose of this thesis, wc will focus on the historical background 
and the impact of racial divisions and conflicting geo-political interests on the awakening--or 
lack thereof--of a revolutionary consciousness among the masses in The Congo. 
3.1 Necessary Objective Preconditions 
Guevara believed all venues of action must be exhausted before taking up armed conflict 
(G. Warfare 14; Moreno 115; Taber 25). When turning to guerrilla warfare as a last resort , 
Guevara expressed that there are certain preconditions necessary to develop a revolutionary 
situation (G. Warfare 14; Moreno 115) : "Objective conditions for struggle are provided by the 
people's hunger , their reaction to their hunger, the terror unleashed to crush the people's reaction 
and the wave of hatred that the repression creates" ("Cuba: History" 136). According to Jose A. 
Moreno, such necessary preconditions result from: 1.) An illegitimate government; 2.) Tensions 
that cannot be addressed through regular /legal means of action; and 3.) No legal action has 
changed the situation (115). According tofoco theory , based on the historical background of The 
Congo, certain objective conditions were already in place for a revolutionary struggle (Guevara , 
"A Method" 267). Unlike Cuba, The Congo was emerging from colonialism in 1960 . From the 
late 1800s and early 1900s on , The Congo had been under Belgian rule (Hennessy 79-83; 
Lumumba; BBC Democratic; Leslie 8; Nzongola-Ntalaja 26). Exploitation, discrimination, 
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killings, and other ongomg conflicts run deep in The Congo's history (Nzongola-Ntalaja; 
Lumumba; BBC Democratic). For example, Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja depicts the economic 
exploitation of over a century forced upon the Congo: "[I]n 110 years of mineral extraction, the 
wealth of the country has not been used to the benefit of the great majority of its people. Since 
the days of King Leopold, it has gone to serve the interests of the country's rulers and those of 
their political allies and business partners in the international community" (28). The Congo as a 
postcolonial state resolved little of the country's issues and remained a conflict zone. For 
example, Joseph-Desire Mobutu's regime from 1965 to 1997, promised peace and stability but 
instead governed "at the pleasure of foreign powers to the disadvantage of their own people" 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja 141-145). The Mobutu regime was born during the Cold War era and was 
brought to power through the external support of the United States and its allies (Nzongola-
Ntalaja 141-143). 9 His dictatorship was to become synonymous with acts of assassination, 
massacres of civilians, and banishment to penal colonies, among other atrocities (Nzongola-
Ntalaja 141). Due to its history as a colonized nation and an area where outside powers have long 
ruled , Guevara was convinced that The Congo had the objective preconditions necessary for the 
emergence of a revolution ("A Method" 267; Congo 20) . 
Guevara believed that the exploited masses shared common interests and goals, which 
served as the basis for solidarity when fighting the enemy ("A Method" 267; Moreno 123). 
Consequently, he perceived the nature of the struggle to be international, thus making it an 
international revolution . As stated in his last letter to his children, Guevara believed that a person 
must "always be capable of feeling deeply any injustice committed against anyone , anywhere in 
the world" -that we must do what is possible to heal that injustice without limiting ourselves to 
9 During the Cold War, these outside sponsors had thought that in order to protect and promote their interests in 
Third World countries , a leader with no political base was better than one with a strong political position such as 
Fidel Castro from Cuba or Patrice Lumumba of The Congo (Nzongola-Ntalaja 142-143). 
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political borders ("His Children" 371 ). 10 He felt it was his duty to continue the revolutionary 
mission to fight against imperialism wherever it took him ("To Fidel" 375). Guevara believed in 
his own leadership ability to lead an international revolution, which he expressed in a farewell 
letter to Fidel Castro when leaving Cuba to continue the revolutionary movement abroad : "Other 
nations of the world summon my modest efforts. I can do that which is denied you because of 
your responsibility at the head of Cuba ... " ("To Fidel" 375) . Guevara viewed Cuba as the 
revolutionary vanguard of Latin America and saw the successful use of guerrilla warfare in the 
Cuban Revolutionary War as an example to follow in other locations around the world 
("Socialism" 258). 
Guevara thought that the objective factors in The Congo were ripe for a cornrnittedfoco 
to improve the country's subjective conditions, of leadership and strategy, and initiate a 
revolution. Indeed, the revolutionary situation in The Congo had already been developing for 
some time (Nzongola-Ntalaja). African resistance against colonial rule had taken form in peasant 
rebellions , workers ' revolts , and urban uprisings during the early to mid 1900s and with 
"politico-religious " movements since 1921 (Nzongola-Ntalaja 42, 51, 60). Given the existing 
objective preconditions in The Congo , the Cuban Revolutionary War experience, and Guevara's 
internationalist ideals, the rebel strategist left for the African nation in 1965 to offer his 
experience and knowledge as a guerrilla combatant and help strengthen the revolution in the 
country (Guevara, "A Method" 275 ; Guevara, "To Fidel" 375; Guevara , "Socialism" 258 ; Dodd 
"Che" ; Nzongola-Ntalaja 13-60; Lumumba; BBC Democratic; Guevara, "Preface" 16; G. March 
7; Spicer-Escalante 394). 
IO Further exemplifying his international revolutionary spirit , on December 11, 1964 , Guevara addressed the 
Nineteenth General Assembly of the United Nations in New York expressing that "[a]II free men of the world must 
be prepared to avenge the crime of the Congo ," manifesting his internationalist position (Guevara , "United Nations " 
321 , 326). He shortly later became an on-the-ground guerrilla combatant in The Congo in 1965. 
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3.2 Subjective Conditions within The Congo 
Guevara begins his Congo Diary1 1 cautioning the reader with a preface titled "An initial 
Warning" whose first sentence reads "this is the story of a failure" (15). Guevara's failed 
assessment partially came from quickly realizing that he faced the enormous task of unifying a 
country that had not reached "real revolutionary maturity" (Congo 22; G. March 11). That is, 
The Congo did not have the necessary revolutionary consciousness required to continue an 
ongoing revolution for the development of a new society and people (Dodd "Che"; Guevara, 
Congo 22 ; Guevara , "Socialism" 252; Guevara, Reminisc ences 159; Lowy 17). An incomplete 
understanding of the vital subjective conditions in The Congo, further aided his interpretation of 
the experience as a failure. The Congo had not only deep racial divides but also conflicting geo-
political interests that played prominent roles in the revolution (Nzongola-Ntalaja). 
When the guerrilla leader arrived in country , multiple liberation movements were taking 
place at the same time (Guevara, Congo 18). The Congo was not unified under one revolutionary 
movement , meaning that the masses were not united. A reason for these divisions was the deep 
ethnic and racial divisions that existed amongst the Congolese population (Nzongola-Ntalaja 
216-218 ; Hochschild 160-165; Hennessy 26). It is important to note that the potential for ethnic 
conflict was already grounded in pre-colonial society through its historical roots of inequalities . 
However, it was the colonial system that helped intensify antagonisms and rivalries among 
different ethnic groups by intensifying the rigidity of the already established relations of 
inequality (Nzongola-Ntalaja 218). For example, Belgian colonization helped strengthen ethnic 
11 
Guevara's published account of the liberation movement in The Congo was written in 1966 , at the end of his 
participation in The Congo ' s Revolutionary War (G. March 5). 
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divides amongst the Hutu, Twa, and Tutsi peoples (Nzongola-Ntalaja 216-218). In 1925, the 
Belgian Congo annexed two African pre-colonial kingdoms, Burundi and Rwanda, which had 
previously survived European conquest (Nzongola-Ntalaja 216). Belgium advanced from 
governing one territorial unit to governing three distinct areas as one colonial entity (Nzongola-
Ntalaja 216). Although the Hutu, Twa, and Tutsi shared the same culture and language, an 
increasing oppression under colonialism caused advantages for the Tutsi and disadvantages for 
the Hutu (Nzongola-Ntalaja 218). This deepened the socio-economic inequalities already in the 
societal structure, further instigating greater ethnic divides (Nzongola-Ntalaja 217). 12 
Racial divisions at times cut deeper than ethnic divides in The Congo due to its brutal 
history of colonialism. During King Leopold's rule , the economic interest in The Congo's 
resources led to an atrocious exploitation of the local population. Take for example, the Anglo-
Belgian India Rubber and Exploration Company that went to The Congo to collect rubber 
(Hochschild 160). Gathering rubber was a physically painful and an arduous process (Hochschild 
161). The laborers had to disperse deeply into wild rain forests , often travelling days to find fresh 
rubber vines (Hochschild 160-163) . Who would do this strenuous work? Europeans found 
needed labor for the rubber enterprise by implementing policies of hostage-taking of natives and 
by severing their natives' hands , feet, and other body parts (Hochschild 161-165). Colonization 
of the Belgian Congo meant that an African had no rights and a European's word was law 
(Hennessy 26). Such memories remain raw for the peoples of The Congo (Hochschild 165). 
12 
The three social groups differed in social status and occupations, as well as physical characteristics (Nzongola-
Ntalaja 217). Yet, neither race nor ethnicity distinguished the groups' level of influence and authority in pre-colonial 
society (Nzongola-Ntalaja 217). Rather , the "proximity and /or service to the royal court and its representatives in the 
provinces" determined their ranks (Nzongola-Ntalaja 217). The Twa had a low social status and were often 
discriminated against (Nzongola-Ntalaja 217). The Hutu had a middle social status since they had agricultural 
positions and were clients of Tutsi nobility (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2 I 7). Lastly, many Tutsi were cattle owners who had 
ties with the royal court and were involved in the court ' s matters of territorial expansion (Nzongola-Ntalaja 218). 
Thus , with the intensifying of colonial oppression , the rigidity in these ethnic relations increased (Nzongola-Ntalaja 
2 I 8). 
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This situation posed a problem for Guevara because without the unification and support 
of the masses,foco theory states that there cannot be a revolution as guerrilla warfare is "a war of 
the people" ("A Method" 267). The intensified ethnic and racial divisions of The Congo differed 
from those of Cuba where the guerrilla combatants and peasants of the revolutionary movement 
also shared cultural, linguistic , and racial backgrounds (Nzongola-Ntalaja 216-218; Hochschild 
160-165; Hennessy 26; Moreno 132). Instead of deepening existent divides-such as in The 
Congo--these commonalities allowed the Cuban masses to become unified, despite the fact that 
Cuba bad previously been under North American imperialistic influence (Perez-Stable 4-1 0; 
BBC Cuba). 
Jn analyzing The Congo's racial and ethnic divisions, we must remember it was a country 
drawn up on a map by Europeans in the 1880s . Borders were set and claims without 
consideration for the demographics of the population and the implications of such actions for 
African peoples (Nzongola-Ntalaja 19; Hennessy 13-16; Hochschild 84-87). The population of 
The Congo, instead of portraying a people , resembled a nation made up of many nations , with 
approximately 250 different ethnic groups , deep tribal divisions , and a cruel history of slavery 
forming racial divisions (Hennessy 10, 26; Nzongola-Ntalaja 14, 19, 20-23; Leslie 4, 68-71). 
Guevara ' s Congo Diary portrays these historical tensions. For example, in regards to ethnic 
relationships and tribalism be wrote the following passage: "The Rwandans and the different 
Congolese tribes regard each other as enemies , and the borders between ethnic groups are clearly 
defined. This makes it very difficult to carry out political work that aims toward regional union" 
(Congo 35). This statement reflects the importance of historical occurrences and the roles they 
play in contemporary realities in The Congo. Another example provided by Guevara's diary 
deals with racial divisions within the country . The following excerpt describes when Guevara is 
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subtly asked by one of the revolutionary leaders, Laurent Kabila, to provide black men to fight in 
the liberation movements of The Congo: "On behalf of our government, I offered him some 30 
instructors . .. He recommended [ ... ] it would be a good idea if the instructors were black [i .e., 
Afro-Cuban]" (Congo 20; G. March 11). Kabila 's key request to Guevara gives insight into the 
country's racial tensions, reflecting the fact that race can matter within the revolution. With a 
light skin complexion and European heritage, Guevara's racial and ethnic make-up also limited 
him greatly in conducting guerrilla warfare in The Congo as well as unifying the masses , because 
whiteness was historically synonymous with oppression (Nzongola-Ntalaja 134) . 
Linguistic differences further contributed to the divides of the Congolese (Nzongola-
Ntalaja 14; Guevara , Congo 42). In the Congo Diary, for example, Guevara writes that when he 
arrived to The Congo, a widely used language was Swahili (42). Since the rebel leader did not 
speak or understand the language , he was assigned an interpreter to be able to communicate with 
the rebel fighters and leaders of the liberation movements , as well as with the peasant population 
(Guevara, Congo 42). Language quickly became a barrier in Guevara's attempt to strengthen the 
development of the revolution (Guevara, Congo 42). Not only was meaning lost in language 
translation but language also posed social class divisions amongst the people: 
Swahili is a language with quite a rich and advanced grammar. .. Swahili has to 
some extent become the language of conquerors and a symbol of superior power . 
It is the second language of nearly all the peasants , but the backwardness of the 
region means that what they actually speak is a highly simplified "basic Swahili." 
(Guevara, Congo 42) 
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Guevara points out that the socio-economic status of a Congolese person directly correlated with 
how s/hc spoke Swahili (Congo 42). An incomplete dialogue existed in Guevara's 
communication with the population of The Congo but also within the people themselves. 13 This 
aided in the lack of unification and the ineffective strengthening of the revolutionary situation, 
the exact opposite of what foco theory prescribes (Guevara, G. Warfare 16; Guevara , "A 
Method" 267, 277). 
Differences in geo-political interests served as another impediment to Guevara's efforts 
to effectively apply foco theory in The Congo. For a long period in the nation's history , these 
interests had taken priority over the interests of the masses (Hennessy 10, 21, 23-24; Nzongola-
Ntalaja 13-41 ; Hochschild ; BBC Democrati c). For instance , since 1884 The Congo has been a 
playing field for the interests of outside powers, given its strategic location and wealth of natural 
minerals and resources (Nzongola-Ntalaja 94). First , during what became known as the 
"Sc ramble for Africa," Europeans all wanted a piece of the cake: Africa's endowment of raw 
materials (Nzongola-Ntalaja 94; Hochschild 26-27). Then, Africa became the locus of 
confrontation between the superpowers in the Cold War era, and most recently , during the Post-
Cold War period , due to the interests of The Congo's neighboring African states (Nzongola-
Ntalaja 94) . During the Cold War alone, the United Nations Security Council deployed an 
approximately 20,000 member peacekeeping force to prevent a conflict between the Soviet 
Union and United States (Nzongola-Ntalaja 94). The deployment was said to be "in response to 
the threat posed to international peace and security by violent conflict in central Africa ," a 
violence brought forth by the interests of external forces, in this case the U.S. and USSR 
13 
Guevara's limited French helped him communicate slightly better in locations where the Congolese masses had 
some knowledge of French , but even so, much of the time he wondered if his revolutionary message was 
communicated with the meanin g and depth he meant to attach to it (Congo Diary). 
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(Nzongola-Ntalaja 94). Even with its independence in 1960, The Congo was controlled by 
outside powers rather than by its own population (Nzongola-Ntalaja 88, 94-95; Lumumba; 
Hennessy 79). For instance , in 1961 the U.S. and Belgium assisted in the murder of the first 
democratically chosen Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba (Nzongola-Ntalaja 95; Leslie 23, BBC 
Democratic). Remembered as the greatest hero of The Congo's independence (Guevara, Congo 
20; Nzongola-Ntalaja 80), the following quote from the film Lumumba portrays this historical 
figure as the voice of the people pushing for social justice for the Congolese masses 14 : "I'd given 
voice to a dream of freedom and brotherhood. Words they couldn't accept. Just words ... " 
(Lumumba) . Patrice Lumumba ' s death shows how The Congo was a pawn during the Cold War 
and how the masses' interests came last to the interests of foreign powers in the African nation . 
World powers and leaders within The Congo government had done little to unify the 
Congolese people and better their daily lives. 15 Local political and liberation leaders too had 
lagged in bringing the people together as one to instill solidarity to fight a common enemy. For 
instance , during the early I 960s the political leaders of the Congolese province of Katanga 
wanted secession (Nzongola-Ntalaja 32, 63, 66, 94-5; Lumumba; BBC Demo cratic). Various 
interests were at play , given that Katanga was not only 16 times larger than Belgium , but was 
also the main source of the nation's wealth and had much of the world's finance involved in its 
activities (Lumumba; Nzongola-Ntalaja 20, 99; Leslie 18; Guevara , Congo 66). Liberation 
leaders ' interests also turned away from the peasant's cause. For example , Kabila , the 
revolutionary leader with whom Guevara chose to collaborate to strengthen The Congo's 
revolutionary situation , rarely met with the masses, much less fought alongside them (Guevara, 
Congo 18-22 , 41). The Congo Diary portrays how Kabila continuously kept revolutionary 
14 
The film , directed by Raoul Peck, portrays The Congo ' s independence movement of 1960 through the lens of 
Prime Mini ster Patrice Lumumba ' s life. 
15 There were exception s, such as Lumumba , who were dedicated to the cause of the people. 
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combatants waiting for his arrival and leadership , which almost never came , as it was said that he 
was attending socio-political matters (41 , 43 , 65, 77; Nzongola-Ntalaja 134): "Each morning we 
heard the same old tune: Kabila has not arrived today , but tomorrow for sure , or the day after 
tomorrow .. . " (Guevara , Congo 41) . Only once did Kabila show up to meet the masses during 
Guevara 's time in The Congo , an occasion that Guevara described in his Congo Diary: "The top 
man was at last in the theater of operations . .. His activity was intense , as if he wanted to catch up 
for lost time ... " (64-65). Within five days of his stay , Kabila withdrew to lead the revolutionary 
situation from a distance in the comforts of Kigoma , a city known for its prostitution and alcohol , 
and the city of Dar es Salaam , located in Tanzania , far away from the hazards of the revolution 
(Nzongola-Ntalaj a 134; Guevara , Congo 25, 26 , 31, 43 , 64-65). Kabila's revolutionary 
leadership in The Congo differed greatly from that of Guevara ' s guerrilla praxis in the Cuban 
Revolutionary War. Reminiscences of the Cuba Revolutionary War offers a portrayal of 
Guevara 's leadership style when emplo yingfoco theory in Cuba: 
"None of us want ed to fight , we did so out of necessity ... " (3 7); 
"As we mov ed to tak e up our attack positions , our greatest concern was for the 
civilians " (95) ; 
'This was a very favorable position for us , where we could annihilate their 
forward guard . . . " (177). 
Such passages from Guevara ' s diary of the Cuban Revolutionary War , exemplify how the 
guerrilla leader fought alongside his guerrilla combatants and was with them through every step 
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of the struggle-a characteristic of/oco leadership he did not find in The Congo, nor was able to 
develop. 
Guevara's Congo Diary is replete with experiences that do not match the principles, 
nature of the combatants , and the purpose that his /oco theory states. He describes the 
revolutionary situation in The Congo as the following: "The fundamental character of the 
People's Liberation Army was that it was a parasitic army that did not work, did not train, did 
not fight, and demanded provisions and labor from the local population , sometimes with extreme 
brutality" (38-39) . Throughout Guevara's written account of the struggle in The Congo, there is a 
continuous , frustrating lack of organization and discipline among the revolutionaries. Near the 
beginning , Guevara's distress came from many areas including the combatants' chaotic shooting , 
their wasting of ammunition , and their lack of following their guerrilla leader's orders: 
Of the 160 men , 60 had deserted by the time of the engagement and many others 
never managed to fire a shot .. . the Congolese opened fire on the barracks , 
generally shooting in the air because most of them kept their eyes shut while 
pressing the triggers of their automatic weapons until the ammunition ran out. 
(Congo 58) 
Towards the end of Guevara ' s time in The Congo , troops continued to refuse to fight by 
withdrawing from action on their own initiative , thus deserting the guerrilla band (Guevara, 
Congo 148, 150, 156). Eventually, commanders within the guerrilla movement began to spread 
rumors about the Cuban combatants questioning their legitimacy , furthering a lack of trust: 
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The incident with the grenades . .. was passed by "Radio Bemba" [word of mouth] 
in a way that suggested the Cubans had placed the devices and that the Congolese 
had fallen into the trap . Such outrageous stories were the specialty of Commissar 
Bendera Fest6n , Commander Huseini . .. never tired of throwing insults around me. 
(Guevara, Congo 157-158) 
Such examples show that Guevara wasn't able to fully develop the principles of Jaco theory 
within the guerrilla campaign in The Congo (Guevara , Congo). The Congolese revolutionaries 
were not "social reformers " willing to die at any moment for the struggle, as Guerrilla Warfare 
suggests (17, 53; Guevara , Congo 49, 54-55, 150, 156), nor were they the bearers of the people's 
cause and protectors of the masses (50). Instead, Guevara described them as mercenaries (Congo 
49) . 
In The Congo , both the guerrilla combatants and the civilian population lacked the 
necessary political-ideological development for the sustainability of the struggle (G . March 7). 
They lacked concientizaci6n , a strong consciousness of the liberation movement as an 
ideological engagement , necessary for the development of a new society and a "New Man" (G. 
March 7; Guevara , Congo 22; Spicer-Escalante 394 ; Guevara , G. Warfare 20; Guevara , 
"Socialism" 252, 256 , 260). Without the masses as a unified entity , according to "Guerrilla 
Warfare: A Method ," the guerrilla struggle is bound to end in disaster (267). Guevara interpreted 
his experience in The Congo in this manner: there was no unified group, which led to an overall 
demoralization and the failure of the revolutionary situation ( Congo 15- 16). 
4 . Conclusions 
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Ultimately, Guevara's Congo Diary shows that Guevara's ideals and values differed from 
those of the Congolese. He saw revolution as an international fraternity of man fighting for 
shared causes against a common enemy, with a focus on the development of socio-economic 
status awareness - a developed revolutionary consciousness ( Congo 18-19). The Congolese rebels 
did not perceive the liberation struggles through this lens. Rather , the main concern of the 
various liberation movements in The Congo addressed race relations and conflicting geo-
political interests. Revolution for The Congo was a question of race and was for the purpose of 
ridding their nation of an ever-present European colonialism. Subjective conditions were being 
addressed instead of the ideologically based socio-economic awareness Guevara emphasized 
(" United Nations" 326). Thus, Guevara could not represent what the people wanted or what they 
stood for because of the subjective conditions present in the area . This demonstrates that 
Guevara didn ' t fully comprehend the environment he was in, nor did he have deep enough 
understanding of the other. He did not perceive the deep divisions that existed in The Congo due 
to a person ' s racial make-up , nor did he realize that he could not lead a revolution in The Congo 
because of the symbolic meaning of his light skin color. For the Congolese , his white skin was 
synonymous with European colonial oppression. Guevara was so deeply engaged in his ideology 
of an international revolution that it limited his realization that the subjective conditions present 
in The Congo were unfavorable for his purpose and mission in The Congo: to create a guerrilla 
joco , a small and cohesive group that could lead the revolution . The unfavorable subjective 
factors limited the masses in their ability to engage in the process of developing a revolutionary 
consciousness required for the development of joco theory in The Congo . Guevara's Congo 
Diary exemplifies this point, displaying the fact that the guerrilla combatants in The Congo were 
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unable to reach an understanding of what it meant to be a revolutionary and, thus, were unable to 
develop a foco -what would have been the vanguard of a revolutionary movement in The Congo. 
ln the case of Ernesto 'Che' Guevara's guerrilla campaign in The Congo, although the 
objective preconditions were ripe for a revolutionary foco to develop, the subjective conditions 
were the stronger, determining factors of the outcomes in the liberation movement. As liberation 
movements continue today, the study of Ernesto 'Che' Guevara's theoretical ideology and praxis 
of guerrilla warfare provide a framework that helps analyze the underlying reasons for this type 
of armed conflict. Such an analysis is imperative to understand how this style of war influences 
nearly every aspect of society, and how to better progress socially, economically, and politically 
in those areas of society that the guerrilla band impacts. 
The Syrian Rebels exemplify a contemporary guerrilla movement that can be analyzed 
through Guevara's works in order to better understand their motives , purpose, and impact on 
society. For instance , a New York Times article recently stated the following in regards to the 
nature of the Syrian Rebels fight: "For many of the fighters, the new offensive had an especially 
emotional character, of a sort played out often in Syria's displaced population : These were men 
trying to return to villages from which they had been driven at gunpoint" (Chivers). Such 
manifestations of rebel warfare prove that these movements still occur , frequently for the same 
reasons that Guevara ' s theory stresses: power, corruption, social justice, and revolutionary 
ideals. They also exemplify that an ideologically motivated people can triumph (Guevara , G. 
Warfare 13; 15; 20, Taber 188; 190). As C.J . Chivers writes, "[s]everal fighting groups 
collaborated under a formally unified command; their thrust across the flatlands made progress." 
Thus, contrary to popular beliefs Guevara's/oco theory did not end with his death, but rather the 
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rebel strategist's revolutionary ideology and praxis continue to hold relevance well after his 
death. 
While Guevara's/oco theory provides a revolutionary lens through which we can interpret rebel 
movements, it is not a fully comprehensive report of irregular war. There are questions left 
unanswered that may later provide fruitful research, such as looking into Guevara's idea of an 
ongoing, international revolution. ls the consciousness required for the international revolution 
Guevara envisioned possible for the majority of humanity? What is necessary to engage with and 
develop that process of consciousness? Does an international liberation movement currently 
exist? Another important area of analysis could be to distinguish where the line between guerrilla 
warfare and terrorism lies. What makes guerrilla warfare different from terrorism? When do 
characteristics of one mesh with the other? Also, is one more of an ideological engagement than 
the other? These questions are relevant and necessary queries that both nations where guerrilla 
movements are present or in development , as well as nations who face potential guerrilla 
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